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Abstract: Motivated by Google’s technology specifications on Android devices, we consider firms’ 
decisions on production timing in a co‐opetitive supply chain comprising a manufacturer and an original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM), where the manufacturer acts as the OEM’s upstream contract 
manufacturer and downstream competitor. We consider the market acceptance uncertainty of key product 
designs. If a firm decides to implement ex post production strategy (PS), it can delay the production until 
the market acceptance uncertainty of its product is resolved. Otherwise, ex‐ante production strategy (AS) 
is implemented. We find that, due to the co‐opetition, PS does not always benefit either the manufacturer 
or the OEM, because the value of delayed production is diminished as the competitor may commit a 
production quantity earlier under AS. Further, firms’ decisions on production timing are dependent on the 
degree of market acceptance uncertainty of their products and competition intensity. We find that both 
firms choose PS when uncertainty is high, while only one of them chooses PS when uncertainty is 
moderate or low. Interestingly, when the competition is intense, the manufacturer tends to choose PS, 
which can benefit from both the resolved market acceptance uncertainty and OEM’s early commitment of 
production quantity. 
 
Keywords: Co-opetition, Market acceptance, Production timing, Technology specifications 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, many cell phone companies have outsourced their production to other manufacturers that 
also sell self‐branded phones. For example, Google outsourced the production of its phone, Pixel, to HTC 
(Wired 2016). Meanwhile, HTC produced its self‐branded phone and competed with Google in the 
consumer market. In this case, the manufacturer becomes both Google’s upstream partner and 
downstream competitor. This “co‐opetition” relationship (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996) has been 
observed among Google and Google’s other upstream manufacturers. 
The competition and cooperation among original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)1 and their 
competitive manufacturers have received attention in the operations management field. Previous studies 
have examined the supply chain parties’ strategic decisions and their incentives (e.g., selling or not selling 
self‐branded products) in different industries. For example, Lim and Tan (2010) and Wang et al. (2013) 
study electronics products. Chen et al. (2012) focus on the computer industry. Hsu et al. (2017) is 
motivated by the examples in retailing and logistics industries. In this study, we focus on the cell phone 
industry, particularly those phones with the Android operating system. 
Since Android is open source, if firms customize their Android phones arbitrarily, it may expose Android 
to the risk of fragmented user experience. Therefore, Google tries to control hardware and software 
specifications to avoid such a risk by providing Android’s Compatibility Definition Document 
(CDD).2 For example, the CDD requires the aspect ratio of a phone screen to be between 4:3 and 16:9. 
With these specifications, Google is able to ensure the “reliability and consistency” of the user experience 
on Android phones (Wired 2016). Furthermore, this CDD plays a significant role in the supply chain 
structure and manufacturers’ operational decisions. 
Although Google provides the CDD, it is up to cell phone firms to decide whether they will follow the 
CDD. If a manufacturer decides not to follow the CDD, the firm may suffer from significant uncertainty 
in market acceptance because Android’s CDD is designed according to mainstream preference and is well 
known among enthusiastic Android fans. For example, in 2014 Amazon launched its Fire Phone running 
on a heavily customized Android operating system. This system is against many CDD specifications (e.g., 
it introduced a 3D display that is not part of the CDD). Two months after its release, Amazon was 
reported to have $83 million worth of unsold Fire Phones in its inventory (Time 2014). Having said that, 
not following the CDD is not necessarily a bad thing, because possible innovations could bring significant 
profits. For example, in 2016 Xiaomi launched Mix, an Android‐based phone with a bezel‐less and fillet‐
cutting design as well as a screen aspect ratio of 17:9, which are all against the CDD specifications. This 
phone made “full screen” a hot trend in 2017 (Wired 2017). Therefore, it is a manufacturer’s strategic 
decision on whether or not to follow the CDD, especially in a co‐opetitive setting. In the example of 
HTC, Pixel was made exactly according to Google’s specifications (Wired 2016), whereas HTC saw non‐
compliance in designing its self‐branded phone, e.g., HTC U11+ with a full screen (Gsmarena 2017). 
Further, manufacturers’ decisions on whether to follow the CDD can also affect their production timing, 
which is closely related to market acceptance uncertainty. Companies can make their production quantity 
decisions either before or after they learn the market acceptance of a certain product design. Some 
companies choose to postpone the production decisions until they are fully aware of the uncertainty of 
market acceptance, which is referred to in this study as ex post production strategy (PS). For example, 
HTC released its “full screen” phone U11+ in late 2017 after “full screen” became a trend 
(Gsmarena 2017). Similar strategies were observed in Huawei’s launch of its first “full screen” phone, 
                                                          
1 OEMs in this study are referred to as firms that specialize in their core competencies such as product design, 
development,and marketing, but outsource production to contract manufacturers. This definition is widely adopted 
in literature. See Plambeck and Taylor (2005), Ulku et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2012), Kayis  et al. (2013), Wang et 
al. (2013), Hu and Qi (2018) for more references. In our study, e.g., Google is an OEM that relies on HTC for contract 
manufacturing. 
2 See https://source.android.com/compatibility/cdd 
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Maimang 6 (China Daily 2017), and in its development of the related technology in 2018 
(LetsGoDigital 2018). By contrast, some companies, such as LG and Xiaomi, choose to produce early and 
face the market acceptance uncertainty (BBC 2017, Wired 2017), which is referred to in this study as ex‐
ante production strategy (AS). Table 1 displays the main features from the motivating examples. 
 
Table 1. Main Features from Practice 
Features Corresponding motivating cases 
Co‐opetition 
relationship 
Google relies on upstream competitors (that sell self‐branded phones) for 
manufacturing, e.g., HTC (Pixel), Huawei (Nexus 6P), LG (Nexus 5X) 
Technology 
specifications 
Specifications in Android’s CDD: developed by Google to control phone design and 
ensure user experience 
Market acceptance 
uncertainty 
Uncertainty in consumers’ acceptance of Android‐based phone design 
Specifications (non‐
)compliance 
Amazon Fire Phone and Xiaomi Mix: justify the upside‐ and downside‐effects of 
significant uncertainty due to non‐compliance; HTC U11+: shows non‐compliance 
practice in Google’s supply chain 
Production timing HTC U11+ (PS), Huawei Maimang 6 (PS), Xiaomi Mix (AS), LG (AS) 
 
With a co‐opetitive supply chain comprising an OEM and a manufacturer, we investigate: (i) how the 
difference in market acceptance uncertainty affects co‐opetition between the OEM and manufacturer as 
well as their production timing decisions; and (ii) the manufacturer’s incentive to follow the OEM’s 
specifications in the co‐opetitive setting and the resulting effect. 
We find that, both market acceptance uncertainty and competition intensity play critical roles in firms’ 
strategic choices between AS and PS. In the presence of competition, adopting PS does not always benefit 
a firm. This is because the firm that makes production decision first enjoys the first‐mover advantage 
(referred to as “commitment value” in the literature (Cvsa and Gilbert 2002, Roller and Tombak 1993, 
Spencer and Brander 1992, Wang et al. 2014a)). Intuitively, when a firm faces low market acceptance 
uncertainty, the commitment value may offset the value of information from PS (referred to as 
“information value”). However, with the co‐opetition between the OEM and manufacturer, we further 
find the following: 
1. When both firms face low uncertainty, one firm chooses AS and the other chooses PS in equilibrium 
(i.e., a sequential equilibrium). The underlying reason is that both firms’ early commitment values 
disappear if they choose AS simultaneously (i.e., a simultaneous equilibrium), and their differences in 
market acceptance uncertainty and source of profits result in a sequential equilibrium. In contrast, 
both firms choose PS when they face high uncertainty. This implies that market acceptance 
uncertainty determines the nature of competition and cooperation between the OEM and the 
 4 
 
manufacturer. In a simultaneous equilibrium, the manufacturer and the OEM choose the same 
strategy, and thus competition is intensified. Alternately, in a sequential equilibrium in which one 
firm chooses AS to seize early commitment value and the other firm chooses PS to obtain information 
value, the competition between two firms is softened. Overall, low uncertainty results in less 
competition in a sequential equilibrium. 
2. When uncertainty of the two firms is moderate, their preference over AS/PS is determined by 
competition intensity. Intuitively, the OEM is more likely to choose AS due to its lower uncertainty 
(i.e., lower information value under PS). Consistent with this intuition, we find that the OEM chooses 
AS when competition is sufficiently intense. Interestingly, although firms’ information values from 
PS is significantly reduced by intense competition, the manufacturer still chooses PS in this case. This 
is because, in the co‐opetitive relationship, the manufacturer benefits from the spillover value of the 
OEM’s early commitment. When competition is not very intense, however, the opposite holds true 
(i.e., the OEM chooses PS and the manufacturer chooses AS). This occurs also due to the co‐opetitive 
relationship. The OEM’s commitment value, from AS in this case, is significantly reduced by a high 
wholesale price paid to the manufacturer for contract manufacturing. Conversely, for the 
manufacturer, adopting AS leads to significant commitment value because high profit is achieved 
through both contract manufacturing and selling self‐branded products. 
With regard to the manufacturer’s incentives to follow the OEM’s CDD, we obtain the following 
findings. First, the manufacturer has no incentives to follow the OEM’s CDD when they both have high 
market acceptance uncertainty and the competition is not very intense. The manufacturer’s market 
acceptance uncertainty is decreased by following the CDD, and this can result in a sequential equilibrium 
in which the manufacturer chooses AS and the OEM chooses PS. However, when the market acceptance 
uncertainty is high, the early commitment value from AS cannot offset the loss of information value from 
PS for the manufacturer. Second, the manufacturer may have incentives to follow the OEM’s CDD when 
the OEM’s uncertainty is moderate, the manufacturer’s uncertainty is high, and the competition is 
sufficiently intense. In this case, by following the CDD, the OEM chooses AS, and the manufacturer may 
benefit from high information value in a sequential equilibrium as well as the spillover value from the 
OEM’s early commitment. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. We briefly review the related literature in section 2. 
In section 3, we describe the model setup. In section 4, we analyze firms’ strategic choices between AS 
and PS for the case in which the manufacturer does not follow the CDD, and in section 5, we analyze the 
case in which the manufacturer follows the CDD. The manufacturer’s decision on the CDD is 
investigated in section 6. Sections 7 and 8provide extensions and conclusions. 
 
2 Literature Review 
Our work is related to the research that studies the value of waiting under demand uncertainty. Cachon 
(2004) investigates how order/production timing influences the allocation of inventory risk and hence 
supply chain efficiency. In his model, an early (a late) order is allowed before (after) demand is observed 
under a push (pull) contract, and inventory risk is born by the retailer (supplier). He also designs an 
advance‐purchase discount contract that better allocates the value of waiting under demand uncertainty, 
wherein the inventory risk is shared by the retailer and supplier. Similarly, Dong and Zhu (2007) study 
the impact of pull, push and advance‐purchase discount contracts on supply chain performance and 
identity Pareto improvement opportunities for the supply chain parties. Swinney et al. (2011) formulate 
the competition between an established firm and a start‐up by assuming the former is concerned with 
profit gains while the latter is concerned with the probability of survival. If firms produce late until 
demand uncertainty is resolved, they can benefit from the value of information. They identify equilibrium 
where the start‐up produces early while the established firm produces late. Chen and Xiao (2012) 
investigate the value of forecasting accuracy improvement in a three‐tier supply chain, and they find that 
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the reseller’s improved accuracy is beneficial to both the manufacturer and the reseller under a wholesale 
price contract. Wang et al. (2014a) study two identical quantity competitors and their efficient‐responsive 
choices. An efficient firm produces early while a responsive firm produces late. Wang et al. (2014b) 
analyze firms’ decisions on timing of order (before or after demand is realized) in a three‐tier supply 
chain comprising an OEM, a contract manufacturer, and a supplier, by using two procurement 
outsourcing structures: control and delegation. Choi (2018) considers a fashion supply chain comprising 
an upstream make‐to‐order manufacturer and a downstream risk‐averse retailer. By comparing the slow‐
response (early production) case with the quick‐response (late but responsive production) case, he 
investigates the impact of risk aversion on the quick‐response system and finds that the retailer benefits 
from later production due to a better demand forecast. Choi et al. (2018) and Choi (2017) further explore 
the value of quick‐response by considering a stochastically risk sensitive retailer (i.e., the retailer’s risk 
preference may vary from time to time) and a boundedly rational retailer, respectively. The forgoing 
works are mainly based on newsvendor‐typed models, which emphasize production quantity decisions 
under demand uncertainty, but lack the supply chain parties’ cross interactions when they make decisions. 
The only exception is Wang et al. (2014a), where symmetric competition models and the value of 
production timing are investigated. Our work is therefore mostly close to Wang et al. (2014a), but we 
consider a co‐opetition structure between the OEM and the manufacturer as well as their differences in 
market acceptance. We find that the firms’ AS/PS choices are fundamentally determined by their co‐
opetitive relationships and market acceptance uncertainty. 
Our work is also related to the literature on product design innovation. This stream of literature is 
comprehensively reviewed in Krishnan and Ulrich (2001). Most of the papers in this stream focus on 
cost‐reduction effect of production process innovation within a single firm. There has been recent growth 
in the literature considering the vertical interactions among supply chain parties. For example, by 
focusing on new product development, Bhattacharya et al. (1998) study firms’ product definition timing 
decisions (i.e., early definition to take advantage of low costs, or delayed definition to ensure a better fit 
to consumer preferences) in highly dynamic environments. Gilbert and Cvsa (2003) study product 
innovation interactions between a supplier and a buyer in a supply chain, where the supplier can 
strategically pre‐commit pricing decisions to stimulate downstream innovation, or postpone decisions 
until demand uncertainty is resolved. Ülkü et al. (2005) investigate firms’ optimal timing decisions on 
technological innovation adoption, which is dependent upon competition intensity, cost structure, and 
forecast improvement. Wang and Shin (2015) consider a downstream manufacturer and an upstream 
supplier that invests in innovation, which improves the product quality, thus, increasing the consumers’ 
assessment of the product value. They study the impact of contract types and upstream competition on the 
supplier’s investment in innovation. Wang et al. (2018) explore an upstream technology supplier’s 
licensing decision in two different supply chain structures: (i) the supplier separately licenses its 
technology to a design firm and a manufacturer firm in a network supply chain, and (ii) the supplier 
licenses to a firm with both design and manufacturing capacities in a traditional integrated supply chain. 
Different from these papers’ cost considerations, our work focuses on the effect of product innovations on 
the degree of market acceptance in a co‐opetitive setting, and study how it influences firms’ production 
timing decisions. 
There is a growing amount of literature on co‐opetitive supply chains. Spiegel (1993) shows that 
outsourcing production to a potential rival can reduce its incentives to develop self‐branded business. 
Arya et al. (2007) study a single‐OEM, single‐supplier Cournot competition model, demonstrating that 
supplier encroachment can achieve better performance of both itself and the OEM by reducing wholesale 
price and increasing downstream competition. Lim and Tan (2010) investigate the interactions between an 
OEM and its upstream contract manufacturer (CM), finding that the OEM’s high degree of brand equity 
can prevent the CM from entering the market. Chen et al. (2012) examine the OEM’s sourcing decisions 
in the presence of a competing CM. Wang et al. (2013) consider a co‐opetitive supply chain comprising 
an OEM along with a competitive CM acting as the OEM’s upstream partner and downstream competitor, 
and they examine the impact of quantity competition on their preference over leadership and 
 6 
 
followership. Niu et al. (2015) conduct a similar study under price competition. Compared with the 
forgoing works, differences of our work exist on both practical and theoretical sides. We note that 
previous works study problems such as supplier encroachment, entry deterrence methods, and cooperation 
incentives issues. Our study is motivated by specific observations from the practice in Android phone 
industries. We characterize the manufacturers’ strategies regarding the specifications compliance. This 
links the study of market acceptance uncertainty and production timing in a natural way. We also note 
that, previous works on co‐opetition focus on the profit comparison with and without co‐opetition. 
Differently, we study the players’ incentives toward demand uncertainty, production timing, and 
operational decisions under an existing co‐opetition framework. 
 
3 Model Settings 
3.1 The Structures of the Supply Chain and Market 
Consider a co‐opetitive supply chain comprising an OEM (denoted as o, e.g., Google in our motivating 
example) and a manufacturer (denoted as m), who acts as both the OEM’s upstream partner and 
downstream competitor. The OEM outsources its production to the manufacturer who also sells self‐
branded products. The OEM’s products and the manufacturer’s products are partially substitutable as we 
explain below. Let w denote the wholesale price (for per unit of product) that the manufacturer charges 
the OEM. 
The OEM and the manufacturer engage in quantity competition with market acceptance uncertainty. The 
inverse demand function for firm i is given by 
  (1) 
where  is firm i’s market clearance price, a and  are the deterministic and random parts of the market 
potential, respectively,  and  are the quantities supplied by the two firms, and b ∈ (0, 1) denotes the 
substitutability between the two firms’ products. This form of inverse demand function is a standard 
assumption in the economics and marketing literature (Christen et al. 2009, Singh and Vives 1984, 
Vives 2000, to name a few).3 The parameter b measures the intensity of market competition: The market 
becomes more competitive as b increases. We assume that the random variable , which represents the 
market acceptance uncertainty faced by firm i, has zero mean and variance . We further impose the 
following two assumptions on . 
Assumption 1.  and  are statistically independent of each other, and 
Assumption 2. . 
Assumption 1 states that the OEM and the manufacturer conduct product design independently and 
have exclusive access to a market acceptance signal (relaxing this assumption will not change our main 
intuitions; see section 7.3 for the analysis). Assumption 1 captures the difference in market acceptance 
uncertainty faced by the OEM and the manufacturer. As explained in the Introduction, the OEM’s CDD is 
based on mainstream preference. Hence, the products designed according to the CDD have low market 
acceptance uncertainty. This assumption is consistent with industrial practice. For example, International 
Data Corporation (IDC) reports that, the top two Android‐based phone manufacturers in China, Xiaomi 
                                                          
3 We assume a linear demand function here, which could be partially justified by empirical studies (Galetovic et al. , 
Green and Newbery ). For example, Green and Newbery () believe linear demand competition widely exists and 
works well in parameter estimations. Galetovic et al. () assume a linear demand function and use data from the 
smartphone industry. We admit the limitations of linear demand functions and discuss alternative models as future 
research directions in section 8. 
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and Huawei, face significant variations in market share performance (IDC 2017a,b). In contrast, Google’s 
sales growth in Pixel family was steady (VentureBeat 2018). 
3.2 Three‐Stage Game 
We consider that market acceptance uncertainty can be resolved after a certain time spot. Specifically, 
firms can make quantity decisions either at time 0 (i.e., adopting AS), or at time 1 (i.e., adopting PS). At 
time 0, the market condition noise  is unknown, whereas at time 1, the realization of  can be observed. 
The sequence of events is as follows: 
1. The OEM and the manufacturer observe their valuation of market acceptance uncertainty. The 
manufacturer decides whether or not to follow the CDD. 
2. The OEM and the manufacturer simultaneously choose whether to implement AS (denoted as A) 
or PS (denoted as P); that is, they choose to make quantity decisions at time 0 or time 1. 
3. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price w. 
4. According to their choices on production timing, the OEM and the manufacturer set their quantity 
levels. 
We formulate this problem as a three‐stage game. Figure 1 shows the sequence of events. 
 
Figure 1 Sequence of Events 
 
If the manufacturer does not follow the CDD, it designs the product and faces high uncertainty. The 
expected profit functions of the OEM and the manufacturer are, respectively, 
(2) 
(3) 
Here, we normalize the production cost to zero. Using a non‐zero production cost will only generate 
results that differ by a constant (see section 7.4 for details). If the manufacturer follows the CDD, it shares 
the same uncertainty with the OEM. The expected profit of the manufacturer is 
(4) 
We solve this game backwards. We first solve the third‐stage subgame (wholesale price and quantity 
decisions) for any given production timing choices in stage 2 and decision on the CDD of the 
manufacturer in stage 1. We then solve the timing decisions, and finally we solve the manufacturer’s 
decision on the CDD. To do so, in section 4, we solve the problems in stages 2 and 3 for the case in which 
the manufacturer does not follow the CDD, and in section 5, we analyze the case in which the 
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manufacturer follows the CDD. In section 6, we compare the manufacturer’s profits in these two cases 
and obtain the manufacturer’s optimal decision on the CDD in equilibrium. 
Since the OEM and the manufacturer engage in a simultaneous game if both of them implement AS or 
PS, and they engage in a sequential game otherwise, there are potentially four Cournot competition 
subgames in stage 3: a simultaneous game with uncertainty, a simultaneous game without uncertainty, a 
sequential game with the OEM as the Stackelberg leader, and a sequential game with the manufacturer as 
the Stackelberg leader. It is worth noting that, in a sequential game where one player enters early and the 
other waits, the early mover’s quantity is public information. For notational convenience, we 
let denote the joint actions between the OEM and the manufacturer, 
where α ∈ {(A, A), (P, P), (A, P), (P, A)}. The notation in this study takes a general form of , 
where Xis the quantity of interest that can be profit(Π), quantity(q) or wholesale price(w). The 
superscript  represents the joint actions (α) between the two players under the status of technology 
specifications (non‐)compliance (I ∈ (N, F)), where N(F) indicates that the manufacturer does not (does, 
respectively) follow the CDD when it designs the product. The subscript i can be o(m) for the OEM 
(manufacturer). 
 
 
4 Not Following the CDD (N) 
In this section, we analyze our model in the case where the manufacturer does not follow the OEM’s 
CDD. By backward induction, we first focus on Stage 3 and derive firms’ operational decisions on the 
wholesale price and production quantities in the four possible subgames: (A, A), (P, P), (A, P), (P, A). We 
then investigate firms’ strategic decisions on production timing in stage 2. 
4.1 Stage 3: Firms’ Decisions on  
The equilibrium outcomes of the four subgames are summarized in Table 2. Lemma 1 shows the 
comparisons of equilibrium decisions among these four scenarios. 
Lemma 1. (Comparison of w and q) 
1. ; 
2. ; 
3. ; 
 
By setting a proper wholesale price, the manufacturer is able to (i) increase its business opportunity 
(through ); and (ii) suppress the OEM’s market share. However, Lemma 1shows that the 
manufacturer’s incentives on wholesale pricing are totally different in the scenarios of (P, A) and (A, P). 
In the case of (P, A) where the manufacturer is a leader, the manufacturer aggressively sets a high 
wholesale price (  is large), while it shows less aggression in occupying a large market share (
 is small), to make it a balance between its manufacturing business and its erosion of the OEM’s 
market share (  is moderate). In contrast, in the case of (A, P) where the OEM is a leader, one may 
conjecture that the manufacturer would set a high wholesale price to weaken the OEM’s leadership. 
However, the manufacturer marks down the wholesale price (  is small) to encourage the OEM 
order more (  is large). The manufacturer may benefit from such a low‐pricing strategy, since the 
OEM’s extra gains from its early commitment will spill over to the manufacturer through . 
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Table 2. The Equilibrium Outcomes of Four Scenarios 
 
Scenario 
(A, A) 
Scenario (P, P) Scenario (A, P) Scenario (P, A) 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
    
 
    
Lemma 2. (Impact of b on w, q, and Π) 
1.  is first decreasing and then increasing in b; 
2.  is decreasing in b; 
3.  is first decreasing and then increasing in b; 
4.  and  are both decreasing in b; where α ∈ {AA, PP, AP, PA}. 
Lemma 2 shows that the manufacturer’s wholesale price is determined by competition intensity. More 
precisely, the manufacturer sets a high wholesale price when competition intensity is either high or low, 
whereas it sets a low wholesale price otherwise. We first highlight several essences: (i) as analyzed in 
Lemma 1, the manufacturer’s pricing power might suppress the OEM’s market share; and (ii) the 
interaction between the OEM and the manufacturer is closely related to the product substitutability (i.e., 
positively correlated). Keeping these in mind, we next elaborate the manufacturer’s wholesale price 
decisions (see Figure 2 for illustrations). 
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Figure 2 Effect of Wholesale Price on Firms’ Quantities 
 
When competition intensity is low, there is little interaction between the two firms’ actions because of 
low product substitutability. The OEM can still determine a high order size in spite of a high wholesale 
price. In spite of the OEM’s large quantity, the manufacturer can still choose a high quantity because it 
can still occupy a large market share due to the low competition intensity. This motivates the 
manufacturer to charge a high wholesale price to generate profits in both self‐branded business and 
manufacturing business. 
In contrast, when competition is fierce, the interaction between the OEM and the manufacturer is strong, 
which enhances the manufacturer’s pricing power. The manufacturer thus charges a higher wholesale 
price to suppress the OEM’s market share. A high wholesale price and a high market share compensate 
for the reduced order size in the manufacturing business. In particular, however, when the manufacturer’s 
self‐branded products are improved to be perfectly substitutable to the OEM’s (i.e., b = 1), the OEM will 
withdraw the wholesale order and stop manufacturing business. This implies that, it is necessary for the 
manufacturer to take the OEM’s threat into account when developing self‐branded business. 
When competition intensity is moderate, the manufacturer determines a low wholesale price. Because the 
OEM’s order decreases rapidly as competition intensity increases, a low wholesale price is used to 
incentivize the OEM to purchase more. 
 
4.2 Stage 2: Firms’ Decisions on AS and PS 
As Table 2 shows, profits are different in the four scenarios, but the profits have a similar structure in 
which they are comprised of two parts. The first part is independent of , (referred to as 
riskless profits), while the second part is a function of , (referred to as risk profits). We 
define the commitment value and the information value as follows. 
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Definition 1. Player i’s early commitment value ( ) is defined as the difference between the riskless 
profits of adopting AS and those of adopting PS if player j adopts PS; that 
is, , and . 
Definition 2. Player i’s information value ( ) is defined as the difference between the risk profits of 
adopting PS and those of adopting AS if player j adopts either AS or PS; that is,  if 
player j adopts AS, and  if player j adopts PS. 
If a firm chooses AS to take advantage of early commitment, it faces operational risk, that is, over‐ or 
under‐production due to choosing production quantity before market acceptance is realized. Alternately, if 
it chooses PS, it can postpone the quantity decision until market acceptance uncertainty is resolved to take 
advantage of information. The choice depends on the trade‐off between the commitment value and the 
information value. 
Based on Table 2, the OEM’s and manufacturer’s preferences over AS and PS can be deduced by 
comparing their profits. Table 3 shows the profit matrix of the OEM and the manufacturer. 
 
Table 3. Profit Matrix of the OEM and the Manufacturer 
OEM Manufacturer AS PS 
AS ,  ,  
PS ,  ,  
With the definitions in the profit matrix, we derive the following results. 
Lemma 3. For the OEM, there exists a threshold , such that 
1. ; and 
2.  if and only if . 
Lemma 3 shows that, if the manufacturer chooses AS, it is better for the OEM to choose PS than AS, 
because there is no early commitment value when they both choose AS and play a simultaneous game; 
while there is information value when the OEM chooses PS. 
However, if the manufacturer indeed chooses PS, the OEM’s preference over AS and PS depends on 
market acceptance uncertainty. When uncertainty is low, the OEM chooses AS because the early 
commitment value of AS dominates the information value of PS. In contrast, when uncertainty is high, 
the OEM chooses PS instead of AS. Although AS brings commitment value, it also puts the OEM in a 
position with high operational risk due to large uncertainty; that is, the information value from PS 
dominates the commitment value of AS. Lemma 1 indicates that, to make better production timing 
decisions, firms should evaluate the market acceptance of their products, and effects of early/delayed 
commitment. We find that the equilibrium outcomes of the manufacturer are similar to those of the OEM, 
which are captured in the following lemma. 
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Lemma 4. For the manufacturer, there exists a threshold , such that 
1. ; and 
2.  if and only if . 
Based on Lemmas 3 and 4, we derive a threshold  that uniquely solves , and obtain firms’ 
strategic decisions on production timing in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1. There exists a unique threshold , where we have  when , 
and  when . 
I.  if  
1. If  and , then (A, P) and (P, A) are the two NE; 
2. If  and , then (A, P) is the unique pure NE; 
3. If  and , then (P, A) is the unique pure NE; 
4. If  and , then (P, P) is the unique pure NE. 
II.  if  
1. If  and , then (A, P) and (P, A) are the two NE; 
2. If  and , then (A, P) is the unique pure NE; 
3. If , then (A, P) is the unique pure NE; 
4. If , then (P, P) is the unique pure NE. 
Figure 3 illustrates firms’ strategic choices in equilibrium on the two‐dimensional  plane. The 
solid lines partition the upper left region of Figure 3a and b) into four (three) parts that correspond to four 
(three) outcomes in Proposition 1(I) (Proposition 1(II)).4 It shows that the market acceptance uncertainty 
determines the outcome of competition between the OEM and the manufacturer. Intuitively, AS should be 
a dominant strategy for the firm with low uncertainty because the operational risk under AS is low and the 
information value from PS is small. Conversely, PS should be a dominant strategy for the firm with high 
uncertainty. Finally, we note that (A, A) is not an equilibrium because firms neither receive the 
commitment value nor the information value. 
 
                                                          
4 Because , that is, the manufacturer’s market acceptance uncertainty is larger than the OEM’s, no equilibrium 
occurs in the lower right region. 
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Figure 3 Firms’ Production Timing in the Not‐Following Case  
 
When both firms face low uncertainty (with small  and ), the equilibrium is that one firm chooses AS 
and the other chooses PS (The lower left region of Figure 3a and b). In this sequential game, they choose 
different strategies and obtain the early commitment value and information value, respectively. The 
different strategies result in less competition. 
When both firms have high uncertainty (with large  and ), a simultaneous game occurs in which both 
the OEM and the manufacturer choose PS, resulting in more intense competition (the upper right region 
of Figure 3a and b). This diminishes the information value. The underlying implication is that, a firm is 
suggested to choose PS when market uncertainty is large. This intuition can be widely applied, in spite of 
the supply chain structure (competition/co‐opetition),5 and in spite of the specification compliance 
(following/not following).6 Evidence is that in the Indian smartphone market with large variability, 
Huawei launched its smartphone before Xiaomi and Vivo (Financial Times 2012, Forbes 2017). 
However, according to a recent report by Counterpoint, the latter two’s strategic benefits from PS are 
more significant (Counterpoint 2018). 
When the manufacturer’s uncertainty is much larger than the OEM’s, the equilibrium is that the OEM 
chooses AS to take advantage of the commitment value, and the manufacturer chooses PS to benefit from 
the information value (the upper left region of Figure 3a and b). 
When market acceptance uncertainty of both firms is moderate, we find that the preferences over AS and 
PS of the OEM and the manufacturer are determined by the competition intensity (the lower right region 
of Figure 3a and the middle region of Figure 3b). The OEM chooses AS while the manufacturer chooses 
PS when the competition is sufficiently intense ( ), and the OEM chooses PS while the 
manufacturer chooses AS when the competition is not intense ( ). To explain this result, let 
us first examine how the information value changes with the competition intensity. 
  
                                                          
5 Wang et al. () shows similar intuition in a setting without co‐opetition. 
6 As we will show in section 5, this intuition holds when the manufacturer follows the CDD. 
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Figure 4 illustrates how the information value changes in the competition intensity. One can see that, the 
information value decreases in b and decreases significantly when b is large; that is, the information value 
is significantly reduced when competition is sufficiently intense.7 Thus, the OEM chooses AS to preempt 
the initiative and to obtain the early commitment value. However, the manufacturer chooses PS. Although 
the information value of the manufacturer is also reduced by intense competition, larger 
uncertainty  makes it worthwhile to wait until uncertainty is resolved. Moreover, PS enables the 
manufacturer to benefit from the spillover value from the OEM’s early commitment value. Note that the 
manufacturer’s profits come from two channels: self‐branded business by selling its own products and 
contract manufacturing business by producing for the OEM. By choosing PS, the manufacturer can 
mitigate the competition between the two firms. It also lowers the wholesale price to stimulate the OEM’s 
order. Thus, the OEM will choose a larger order quantity, resulting in more profits for the manufacturer 
from his contract manufacturing business. The information value and the spillover value from the OEM’s 
early commitment make it attractive for the manufacturer to choose PS. This finding explains the 
observations in Google’s supply chain, e.g., HTC’s late product launch in “full screen” phone design. 
However, Google’s late launch might be a blunder (Forbes 2018). 
 
 
Figure 4 The Effect of b on Information Value ( )  
 
Interestingly, in the case with moderate uncertainty and less intense competition (i.e., ), we 
find that the OEM chooses PS even though OEM’s uncertainty is moderate and its information value is 
not high. The reason is that, if the OEM chooses AS, its early commitment value is reduced by a 
significant cost increment paid to the manufacturer for the contract manufacturing service. The gain from 
information value, although not high, still dominates the commitment value; thus, the OEM chooses PS. 
In anticipation of the OEM’s choice, the manufacturer chooses AS with low production quantity and high 
                                                          
7 This intuition can be practical. For example, Mobile World Congress (MWC) is the world’s largest exhibition, 
attracting many mobile device manufacturers to release their products. According to a most recent report by Gartner, 
however, these years Samsung and LG have launched new Android smartphones ahead of MWC (Gartner). Anshul 
Gupta, Research Director at Gartner, attributes this phenomenon to the “unabated competition” (Gartner ), 
suggesting that waiting until the market becomes clear becomes less attractive as competition heats up. 
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price for its own product. We find that the positive effect of the increase in price compensates for the 
decrease in quantity, resulting in a higher profit in self‐branded business for the manufacturer than when 
choosing PS. Further, the manufacturer determines a higher wholesale price, resulting in a higher profit in 
contract manufacturing business. Higher profits in both channels incentivize the manufacturer to choose 
AS. Figure 5 shows how the manufacturer’s commitment value changes in competition intensity. 
 
Figure 5 The Effect of b on the Manufacturer’s Commitment Value (a = 1)  
 
5 Following the CDD (F) 
Consider that the manufacturer follows the OEM’s CDD to conduct product design. In this case, there is 
no difference between the two firms’ market acceptance (i.e., they both have uncertainty ). We derive 
firms’ equilibrium decisions on w and q in Stage 3 (see Table A1 in Appendix A), as well as their 
strategic choices between AS and PS in Stage 2. Firms’ commitment value and information value in this 
case are as follows: , , and  ( , respectively) 
if firm j adopts AS (PS, respectively). 
Similar to Lemma 1 and 1, we derive two 
thresholds  and , and we have: (i) for the 
OEM,  if and only if ; and (ii) for the manufacturer,  if 
and only if . We find that, however, if the manufacturer follows the CDD, firms’ strategic 
choices between AS and PS are fundamentally different from those in the case where the manufacturer 
does not follow the CDD, as shown in Figure 6. By comparing the equilibrium outcomes of these two 
cases, we derive a threshold  ( ) that uniquely solves  ( ), based on which we 
obtain the following results. 
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Figure 6 Firms’ Production Timing in the Following Case  
 
Proposition 2. (Impact of the Manufacturer Following the CDD) 
1. , ; 
2. there exists a unique threshold  satisfying  such that: 
i.  when , 
ii.  when , 
iii.  when , 
Proposition 2 is derived by comparing the thresholds in the cases where the manufacturer follows and 
does not follow the CDD. We show that  ( ) is always larger than  ( ), which indicates that, 
following the CDD expands the region for the equilibrium in which one firm chooses AS and the other 
chooses PS, and shrinks the region in which both firms choose PS. Therefore, the manufacturer’s 
following the CDD increases the possibility of a sequential equilibrium while it reduces that of a 
simultaneous equilibrium. This highlights that following the CDD contributes to the mitigation of supply 
chain competition. 
 
6 Incentives of Following the CDD (Stage 1) 
In this section, we compare the manufacturer’s profits when following and not following the OEM’s 
CDD and derive its decision in Stage 1. To do so, we first derive two lemmas that investigate the 
information value and the commitment value in different scenarios. 
Recall that firm i’s information value, , is a function of  (see Table 4). The 
information value  can be written as , where  is the coefficient of the information value 
and α = sim for simultaneous games and α = seq for sequential games. 
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Table 4. Firm i’s Information Values 
Case Firm j’s strategy AS PS 
N 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
Lemma 5. , where 
, and . 
We have the following observations. First, the coefficient of information value in a sequential game is 
always larger than that in a simultaneous game (i.e., ). Thus, given , a firm’s 
information value is larger in a sequential game than that in a simultaneous game. The explanation is that, 
the competition between the two firms is intensified when they choose PS simultaneously, which 
diminishes the value of PS. On the contrary, the competition is softened by strategic deviation from PS in 
a sequential game, and this results in larger information value. We name it as the cooperation effect on 
information value. Second, the coefficient of information value in a simultaneous game is smaller with 
CDD than that without (i.e., ). This indicates that the manufacturer following the CDD 
reduces the value of information, which is named as transparency effect. Note that the OEM and the 
manufacturer conduct product design independently. Therefore, if the manufacturer does not follow the 
CDD, they do not know each other’s market acceptance, and have to make decisions based on 
expectations. However, if the manufacturer follows the CDD, market acceptance becomes common 
knowledge between the two firms. This change in information transparency results in the difference 
between the coefficients with and without the CDD. Further, the manufacturer following the CDD has 
another negative effect on information value, by directly reducing market acceptance uncertainty , 
which is named as accuracy effect. Accuracy effect has an impact on the manufacturer while transparency 
effect has an impact on both firms. For the convenience of reference, the three effects are summarized as 
follows. 
1. Cooperation effect: given , a firm’s information value is larger in a sequential game than that in 
a simultaneous game. 
2. Accuracy effect: the negative effect of following the CDD on information value by directly 
reducing uncertainty . 
3. Transparency effect: the negative effect of following the CDD on information value in a 
simultaneous game by reducing the coefficient of information value due to the change of 
information transparency. 
We then present the lemma that characterizes the effect of competition intensity on the commitment 
value. 
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Lemma 6. The commitment value of the manufacturer is larger than that of the OEM if and only 
if . 
Using these two lemmas, we can analyze how following the CDD affects the equilibrium. When the 
manufacturer follows the OEM’s CDD, both accuracy effect and transparency effect reduce the two 
firms’ information value (or the firms’ operational risk), resulting in an intermediate state, where both 
firms have the same information values and make their AS/PS choices based on the trade‐off between the 
commitment value and the information value. When , the commitment value of the 
manufacturer is larger than that of the OEM. Therefore, when the information value of the manufacturer 
reduces to a level lower than its commitment value, the information value of the OEM still dominates the 
commitment value. In this case, following the CDD changes the equilibrium from (P, P) to (P, A); that is, 
the manufacturer changes his decision to AS while the OEM remains on PS. When , 
following the CDD changes the equilibrium from (P, P) to (A, P); that is, the OEM changes his decision 
to AS while the manufacturer remains on PS. See Figure 7 for an illustration, which summarizes the most 
interesting results in the shadow region.8 We analyze the results of Figure 7a and b in 
Proposition 1 and 7c in Proposition 1. 
 
 
Figure 7 Equilibrium Changes if Following the CDD  
 
Proposition 3. In the case where  ( , respectively), if 
and  ( , respectively), the manufacturer following the CDD results in the outcome that 
the equilibrium moves from (P, P) to (P, A), that is, the OEM remains on PS while the manufacturer 
changes to AS. The expected profits of the OEM and the manufacturer have the following properties: 
1. , that is, the OEM is better off if the manufacturer follows the CDD; 
2. , that is, the manufacturer is worse off if it follows the CDD. 
Proposition 3 indicates that, in the case where there is less competition, the OEM benefits from the 
manufacturer’s following the CDD if the manufacturer faces high market acceptance uncertainty and the 
OEM’s uncertainty is moderate. This will change a simultaneous equilibrium with direct competition on 
postponement strategy (i.e., PS) into a sequential equilibrium with deviation from PS. The mitigation of 
competition results in two positive effects on the OEM’s profit. First, cooperation effect endows the OEM 
with a larger information value in a sequential game. Second, the OEM has a larger market share because 
it can determine a higher production quantity in the market with less competition. 
                                                          
8 If the manufacturer follows the OEM’s CDD, we have . Then, the equilibrium lies on the line 
as shown in Figure 7. 
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However, it is interesting that more accurate information hurts rather than benefits the manufacturer. By 
following the OEM’s CDD, the manufacturer tries to reduce the operational risk of AS so that it can 
benefit from early commitment. However, this is not a wise decision. Note that the manufacturer has high 
market acceptance uncertainty if it does not follow the OEM’s CDD to design products. Although 
following the CDD can reduce the manufacturer’s uncertainty risk, it significantly reduces the 
information value from PS. Thus, the manufacturer suffers from following the CDD. 
Proposition 4. In the case where , if , the manufacturer following the CDD 
results in the outcome that the equilibrium moves from (P, P) to (A, P), that is, the OEM changes to AS 
while the manufacturer remains on PS. Let , 
and , and then we have 
.The expected profits of the OEM and the manufacturer have the following properties: 
1. , that is, the OEM is worse off if the manufacturer follows the CDD; 
2.  if , and  if , that is, the 
manufacturer is better off by following the OEM’s CDD if  is small and it is worse off if  is 
large. 
This proposition indicates that, given tense competition, when both the OEM and the manufacturer face 
high demand uncertainty, the OEM will be hurt by the manufacturer’s following the CDD. Note that the 
OEM is more sensitive to the reduction of information value when  (see 
Lemma 1). Transparency effect reduces the OEM’s information value to a level lower than the early 
commitment value, and thus the OEM changes to AS. However, the benefit of early commitment cannot 
offset the loss of information value and hence, the OEM is worse off. This provides managerial 
implications in practice. Taking a co‐opetition relationship into consideration, it might not be good for 
Google to simply require the Android‐based phone makers to follow the CDD, especially when 
competition is intense and Google’s CDD does not fit consumer expectation well. 
Note that, even if the manufacturer fails to change to AS by following the OEM’s CDD, there may be 
benefits. Overall, following the CDD has both negative and positive effects on the manufacturer; that 
is, accuracy effect reduces the information value while cooperation effect increases the benefits from 
information in a sequential game. Conversely, remaining on PS endows the manufacturer with spillover 
value from the OEM’s early commitment. It is worth noting that, when the manufacturer faces low 
uncertainty (i.e., with small ), accuracy effect becomes insignificant, which is dominated 
by cooperation effect and spillover value. Therefore, the manufacturer is better off. However, the 
manufacturer is worse off with high uncertainty. A large  induces accuracy effect to be significant, 
which enlarges the loss of information value. In this case, following the CDD makes both the OEM and 
the manufacturer worse off, resulting in a lose‐lose dilemma. 
 
7 Extensions 
In this section, we have four extensions: (i) revenue‐sharing contract, (ii) the manufacturer’s 
postponement of wholesale pricing, (iii) correlation of two firms’ market acceptance uncertainty, and (iv) 
non‐zero production cost. We use the following subscripts, r, w, d, and c, to represent the corresponding 
extensions, if necessary. 
7.1 Revenue‐Sharing Contract 
We have assumed the manufacturer signs a wholesale price contract with the OEM, following previous 
literature on contract manufacturing. In practice, the manufacturer and the OEM are possible to sign a 
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revenue‐sharing contract with two parameters (w, ϕ) (Cachon 2003), where w is the wholesale price, 
and ϕ ∈ [0, 1] is the OEM’s share of revenue. The manufacturer’s share is 1 − ϕ. Following Cachon and 
Lariviere (2005), ϕ is exogenous. Firms’ expected profits are, respectively, 
 
The following proposition shows how ϕ affects the equilibrium. 
Proposition 5. For any given ϕ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a threshold , where , such 
that: When , without (with) following the CDD, PS is the OEM’s dominant strategy. In 
this case, (P, A) is the unique pure NE if  ( ), while (P, P) is the unique pure NE 
if  ( ). 
When ϕ = 1, the revenue sharing model is the same as the base model. In this case,  and the 
equilibrium is exactly the same as shown in Propositions 1 and 2. When ϕ < 1, the equilibrium has 
different structures for three regions of b: , , and . The equilibrium 
structures for  and  are similar to those 
for  and  in the base model. The equilibrium structure for  is 
specified in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 5 shows that under a revenue‐sharing contract, (A, P) cannot be an equilibrium in a less 
competitive market. This is because the manufacturer has an additional source of income from revenue‐
sharing, which encourages the manufacturer to lower the wholesale price and to attract a larger order size 
from the OEM. This incentive of the manufacturer is strong, especially when competition is mild (b is 
small). In this case, a larger production quantity of the OEM does not have much of a negative impact on 
the manufacturer’s profit through competition, but has a positive impact on the manufacturer’s profit 
through revenue sharing. Recall that in the base model, the manufacturer adopts a low‐pricing strategy in 
the scenario (A, P) to spur the OEM to purchase more (see Lemma 1). Under the revenue‐sharing 
contract, the further adoption of a low‐pricing strategy in (A, P) with a small b is not necessary, because 
over‐stimulation of the OEM’s order ( ) might cut down hurting the shared revenue ( ). Thus, 
the manufacturer raises  to make a balance between the profits from contract manufacturing and 
revenue sharing. This reduces the OEM’s early commitment value in (A, P), and induces PS to be the 
OEM’s dominant strategy. 
7.2 Postponement of Wholesale Pricing 
In our main body, we assumed that the wholesale price w is determined before uncertainty resolves, 
regardless of the OEM’s timing decisions (AS or PS). In this subsection, we investigate a case in which 
the manufacturer postpones the wholesale price decisions until the market uncertainty is resolved if the 
OEM adopts the PS strategy to take advantage of the information value. There are two possible scenarios 
in this case: (P, A) and (P, P). In (P, A), the sequence of events is as follows: (i) the manufacturer 
determines  before demand is realized; (ii) after uncertainty is resolved, the manufacturer 
decides w and then the OEM determines . Regarding (P, P), the sequence of events is the same as in the 
base model, except that the decision of w is postponed until demand realizes. 
Our main results qualitatively hold, except that two slight differences arise. First, in the case where the 
manufacturer does not follow the CDD, when firms’ uncertainty is moderate, (P, A) is an equilibrium 
∀b ∈ (0, 1). Recall that in the base model, as b increases, the equilibrium changes from (P, A) to (A, P). 
As b becomes larger, the OEM suffers from a higher wholesale price. In addition, the information value 
also decreases with b. Therefore, the OEM shifts from PS to AS. In response to this change, the 
manufacturer shifts from AS to PS to take advantage of the spillover value from the OEM’s early 
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commitment. However, in the case in which the wholesale price decisions are postponed, the OEM 
benefits from this postponement because it learns  through w and uses it as additional information to 
determine . This extra information compensates the OEM and hence, it remains to choose PS even 
if b is large. 
Second, the impact of the manufacturer’s following the CDD is slightly different when the competition 
intensity b is small. Recall that in Proposition 1, if the manufacturer follows the CDD, the equilibrium 
might change from (P, P) to (P, A). This change makes the manufacturer worse off and the OEM better 
off. However, if the wholesale price is determined after uncertainty is resolved, we can show that this 
change of equilibrium makes the manufacturer worse off only if  is sufficiently large, and it makes the 
OEM better off only if  is sufficiently small. This is because the manufacturer still has information 
benefits (from the postponement of wholesale pricing) even if it switches to AS, which compensates its 
loss of information value from PS. However, since the manufacturer decides the wholesale price after 
uncertainty is resolved, it has more pricing power than in the base model. The impact of this larger pricing 
power is greater when  is large. As a result, the OEM is better off only if  is sufficiently small. 
7.3 Market Acceptance Uncertainty Correlation 
In this subsection, we extend our base model by considering market acceptance uncertainty correlation: 
the manufacturer faces  if he follows the CDD, and he sees  if he does not follow 
the CDD. The random term δ is independent of , with zero mean and variance . Here, δ captures the 
extra uncertainty because of the non‐compliance with the OEM’s CDD. It is a measure of the degree of 
the manufacturer’s non‐compliance. A δ with a larger  represents a manufacturer with less compliance 
with the CDD. If the manufacturer does not follow the CDD, the mean and the variance of  are as 
follows: , and . The correlation 
between  and  is as follows: . When , that is, δ is 0, we 
have ρ = 1. 
Our main results qualitatively hold, except that the manufacturer’s following the CDD does not benefit 
itself any more. Recall that in Proposition 1, the manufacturer benefits from following the CDD if  is 
relatively small. However, if the manufacturer’s uncertainty is correlated with the OEM’s uncertainty, a 
small  indicates that  is small for a given  (note that ), and thus the 
correlation  is large. Given the large correlation, the manufacturer already captures some 
benefit of following the CDD, and it does not see much benefit from actually following it. 
7.4 Non‐Zero Production Cost 
If the manufacturer incurs a marginal production cost c with c < a, firms’ expected profits are, 
respectively, 
 
By comparing the above two expressions with the expressions in 2 and 3 of the main body, one can see 
that the expressions of  are the exactly the same, and the expressions of differ by a single 
term . Actually by simply replacing a with a − c, we can get the new equilibrium outcomes 
and threshold values (except w, which is a weighted average of aand c). As a result, the main results in 
the main body still hold with slightly different threshold values. 
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8 Conclusion 
Technology specifications such as Android’s CDD are often viewed as Google’s important strategy to 
improve the user experience of Android devices, and they are closely linked with production timing 
decisions due to the market acceptance uncertainty. In this study, we develop a model to study the 
production timing decisions in a co‐opetitive supply chain, which comprises an OEM (e.g., Google in our 
motivating example) and a competitive manufacturer, which acts both as the OEM’s upstream partner and 
downstream competitor. The two firms sell partially substitutable products in a market with market 
acceptance uncertainty, which can be resolved after a certain time spot. As the CDD is based on 
mainstream preference, the OEM has lower uncertainty, resulting in more stable demand. They can 
choose either AS or PS, depending on the relative magnitude of the commitment value and the 
information value. 
We find that, both market acceptance uncertainty and competition intensity have a significant impact on 
firms’ strategic choices between AS and PS. Both firms choose PS when they are at the risk of high 
uncertainty, while only one firm chooses PS when the uncertainty is low/moderate. This implies that, 
market acceptance uncertainty determines the nature of competition and cooperation between the OEM 
and the manufacturer. A simultaneous equilibrium occurs when both firms face high uncertainty and a 
sequential equilibrium occurs otherwise. When market acceptance uncertainty of the two firms varies in a 
moderate range, their strategic choices between AS and PS are affected by competition intensity in an 
interesting way. When competition is fierce, intuitively both firms have strong incentives to choose AS. 
However, we find that the OEM chooses AS but the manufacturer chooses PS in spite of his low 
information value. In this way, it can benefit from the OEM’s early commitment, which is named 
as spillover value because of the co‐opetition relationships between the two firms. When competition is 
not very intense, a completely different outcome occurs. By intuition, the OEM is likely to choose AS 
because of low uncertainty and, thus, low operational risk. However, the OEM chooses PS, because 
choosing AS incurs a significant cost increment for production outsourcing. The manufacturer chooses 
AS because of high wholesale price and self‐branded price, resulting in better performances in both 
manufacturing business and self‐branded business. 
We further investigate the impact of following the CDD on firms’ choices between AS and PS. We show 
that information value is influenced by three effects including cooperation effect, accuracy effect 
and transparency effect, the scales of which are respectively modulated by strategic deviation from PS, 
signal accuracy and information transparency. These effects change the trade‐off between the 
commitment value and the information value, and correspondingly determine the profit performance of 
the two firms. They also influence the manufacturer’s incentives of following the OEM’s CDD. Based on 
the analysis, we identify the conditions under which following the CDD benefits the manufacturer. 
These findings provide the following managerial implications to operation managers, especially those in 
Google, HTC, and LG. Note that they have co‐opetition relationships bilaterally but HTC (LG) chose PS 
(AS) strategy when “full screen” phone design was launched. Specifically, we suggest that 
1. the competitive manufacturer chooses PS when market uncertainty is large. Our suggestion can 
be consistent with practice because we observe that, in the Indian smartphone market with large 
variability, the followers gain prominent benefits from PS. 
2. the competitive manufacturer implements AS in a market with small variability and intense 
competition, because the information benefits from PS are limited. This result is consistent with 
the observation that these years LG has launched new Android smartphones ahead of MWC due 
to the “unabated competition”. 
3. in a market with moderate uncertainty and intense competition, the OEM is better to choose AS 
while the manufacturer chooses PS. This finding explains HTC’s late product launch in “full 
screen” phone design. However, we find that Google’s late launch practice might be a blunder. 
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4. the OEM might either benefit from or be hurt by the manufacturer’s following the CDD, 
depending on competition intensity. In reality, as competition intensifies, Google has been 
witnessed to take an increasingly strict control over specifications on Android phone designs. 
Google might gain, if competition is not that intense, from such tightening which ensures the user 
experience on Android phones. However, Google has to be cautious if competition continues to 
intensify, because it might be exposed to the threat from its rivals. 
Regarding the future research directions, we recommend to study newsvendor models under push 
(ordering before demand realization) and pull (ordering after demand realization) contracts, although the 
analysis can be challenging. In practice, it is also possible that firms only obtain an updated signal of the 
market rather than the full information. However, that requires new models based on Bayesian updating, 
and hence, is beyond the scope of our study. 
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Appendix A 
In this Appendix, we provide the derivation of Table 2 with regard to how to solve the four subgames for 
the case in which the manufacturer does not follow the CDD. Proofs for results in the main body and 
extensions are available in the online Appendices. 
A.1. Derivation of Table 2 
(A, A) Simultaneous Game: Given wholesale price w, the OEM and the manufacturer maximize their 
expected profits by, respectively, 
 
Then we have the best responses  and , resulting in the 
quantities  and . The manufacturer maximizes his expected 
profit by setting the wholesale price as . The equilibrium outcomes are as 
follows: , , 
, , . 
(P, P) Simultaneous Game: Note that, market acceptance is uncertain at time 0 while the uncertainty is 
resolved at time 1. Thus, a firm maximizes its expected profit if choosing AS while it solves a 
deterministic problem if choosing PS. Given the wholesale price w and the market acceptance condition 
, the OEM and the manufacturer maximize their expected profits by, respectively 
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Then the best responses are  and , 
resulting in the quantities  and . 
Anticipating the quantities above, the manufacturer maximizes the expected profit by setting wholesale 
price as . The equilibrium outcomes are: 
, , , 
, . 
(A, P) Sequential Game: This scenario begins with the event that the manufacturer sets the wholesale 
price. Then we have a Stackelberg setting where the OEM decides quantity  at time 0, and the 
manufacturer makes the quantity decision at time 1 after observing  and the market acceptance 
condition . At time 1, given  and , the manufacturer maximizes the profit by solving a deterministic 
problem: 
 
and produces . Anticipating the response of the manufacturer, the OEM makes 
a quantity decision to maximize the expected profit by 
 
It can be verified that the OEM’s quantity is . Then the manufacturer’s quantity 
is . According to the quantities, the manufacturer 
maximizes the expected profit 
 
by setting the wholesale price as . The equilibrium outcomes 
are: , , 
, , . 
(P, A) Sequential Game: In this scenario, the manufacturer first sets the wholesale price and then decides 
the quantity level  at time 0. After observing  and the market acceptance condition , the OEM 
makes a quantity decision at time 1. Given  and , the OEM maximizes the profit by solving a 
deterministic problem 
 
The best response is . In anticipation of the response above, the 
manufacturer makes a quantity decision to maximize the expected profit by 
 
The manufacturer’s quantity can be derived as , and that of the OEM 
is . Conjecturing on the quantities, the manufacturer sets the 
wholesale price to maximize the expected profit by 
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The wholesale price is . We have the equilibrium outcomes as follows: 
, , , , . 
 
 
Table A1. Equilibrium Outcomes of the Case with Following the CDD 
 
 
Scenario (A, A) Scenario (P, P) Scenario (A, P) Scenario (P, A) 
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A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 can be easily derived by comparing the dierence of wN , qN o , and q
N 
m ,
 2 fAA;PP;AP; PAg, respectively. We omit the proof here.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Here we prove the monotonicity of qN AAm regarding b. Proofs of the others are similar.
The rst derivative of qN AAm with respect to b is
@qN AAm
@b
= a( 8+16b 3b
2)
(8 3b2)2 . By solving the
equation @q
N AA
m
@b
= 0, we have an extreme point b = 2(4 
p
10)
3
2 (0; 1). The second deriva-
tive of qN AAm with respect to b, which is evaluated at b =
2(4 p10)
3
, is @
2qN AAm
@b2

b=
2(4 p10)
3
=
  45( 4+
p
10)a
64( 5+2p10)3 > 0. So b =
2(4 p10)
3
is a minimum point. Therefore, qN AAm is decreasing in b
when b 2 (0; 2(4 
p
10)
3
), and is increasing in b when b 2 (2(4 
p
10)
3
; 1).
Proof of Lemma 3.
(1) N AAo  N PAo = 4(1 b)
2a2
(8 3b2)2  
h
(1 b)2a2
(4(2 b2)2 +
1
4
2o
i
= a
2( 1+b)2b2( 16+7b2) (16 14b2+3b4)22o
4(8 3b2)2( 2+b2)2 < 0.
(2) N APo   N PPo = 2(1 b)
2(2 b2)a2
(8 5b2)2  
h
4(1 b)2a2
(8 3b2)2 +
2(2 b2)
(4 b2)2
2
o
i
=
2

a2b4( 16+9b2)(4 4b b2+b3)2+(2 b2)(64 64b2+15b4)22o

( 2+b)2(2+b)2(8 5b2)2(8 3b2)2 .
By solving the equation N APo   N PPo = 0, we have No = a
2b4(1 b)2(4 b2)2(16 9b2)
(2 b2)(64 64b2+15b4)2 . If
2o < 
N
o , then 
N AP
o > 
N PP
o ; if 
2
o > 
N
o , then 
N AP
o < 
N PP
o .
Proof of Lemma 4 is similar to that of lemma 3. In lemma 4 we have Nm =
a2b2(1 b)2(4 b2)2
8(2 b2)2(8 3b2) .
Proof of Proposition 1.
(A;A) cannot be an equilibrium because N AAo < 
N PA
o and 
N AA
m < 
N AP
m .
(A;P ) is an equilibrium if it satises N APo > 
N PP
o and 
N AP
m > 
N AA
m , i.e., 
2
o < 
N
o .
(P;A) is an equilibrium if it satises N PAo > 
N AA
o and 
N PA
m > 
N PP
m , i.e., 
2
m < 
N
m .
(P; P ) is an equilibrium if it satises N PPo > 
N AP
o and 
N PP
m > 
N PA
m , i.e., 
2
o > 
N
o
1
and 2m > 
N
m . So we preliminarily obtain the following equilibrium conditions8<:
(A;P ); if 2o < 
N
o
(P;A); if 2m < 
N
m
(P; P ); if 2o > 
N
o and 
2
m > 
N
m
The equilibrium conditions for further derivation depend on the relative sizes of No and 
N
m :
No  Nm = a
2( 2+b)2( 1+b)2b2(2+b)2( 512+1088b2 712b4+147b6)
8(8 5b2)2(8 3b2)2( 2+b2)2 . By solving the equation 
N
o  Nm = 0,
we have a unique threshold b = 0:9565. If 0 < b < b, then No < 
N
m ; if b
 < b < 1, then
No > 
N
m . Consider case I where 0 < b < b
; No < 
N
m . We have
(1) when 2o < 
N
o ,
if 2m < 
N
o , then (A;P ) and (P;A) are the two NE;
if No < 
2
m < 
N
m , then (A;P ) and (P;A) are the two NE;
if 2m > 
N
m , then (A;P ) is the unique pure NE.
(2) when No < 
2
o < 
N
m ,
if 2m < 
N
m , then (P;A) is the unique pure NE;
if 2m > 
N
m , then (P; P ) is the unique pure NE.
(3) when 2o > 
N
m ,
if 2m > 
N
m , then (P; P ) is the unique pure NE.
Then we arrive at the results as follows:
(1) If 2o < 
N
o and 
2
m < 
N
m , then (A;P ) and (P;A) are the two NE;
(2) If 2o < 
N
o and 
2
m > 
N
m , then (A;P ) is the unique pure NE;
(3) If No < 
2
o < 
N
m and 
2
m < 
N
m , then (P;A) is the unique pure NE;
(4) If 2o > 
N
o and 
2
m > 
N
m , then (P; P ) is the unique pure NE.
Proof of case II where b < b < 1; No > 
N
m is similar to that of case I.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Before we give the proof of Proposition 2, we rst derive the equilibrium outcomes of the
case where the manufacturer follows the OEM's CDD. Similar to the case without following
the CDD, we study four basic games and draw the equilibrium outcomes listed in Table 5.
2
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes in Table 5 with those in Table 2, we nd that the
manufacturer's following the CDD has no eect on the equilibrium wholesale prices and
quantities, but makes a dierence in the equilibrium prots. For convenience of explanation,
we adopt a unied expression format of the equilibrium wholesale prices (quantities) in the
case with and without following the CDD as follows:
w = wN  = wF ; qi = q
N 
i = q
F 
i :
The OEM and the manufacturer make their AS/PS choices by comparing the prots in
prot matrix. With an analysis on the matrix, we draw the following results. For the OEM,
there exists a threshold Fo =
2a2b4( 2+b+b2)2(16 9b2)
(64 64b2+15b4)2 , where (1) 
F AA
o < 
F PA
o , and (2)
F APo > 
F PP
o if and only if 
2
o < 
F
o . For the manufacturer, there exists a threshold
Fm =
a2b2( 1+b)2(2+b)2
4( 2+b2)( 8+3b2) , where (1) 
F AA
m < 
F AP
m , and (2) 
F PA
m > 
F PP
m if and only
if 2o < 
F
m. The format of the results is similar to that of Lemma 3 and 4. The detailed
explanation is ignored here for its robustness regardless whether the manufacturer follows
the OEM's CDD or not.
The equilibrium outcomes of the extended timing game in the case with following the
CDD can be derived and summarized as follows. Similar to the proofs of Proposition 1,
one can easily derive that there exists a unique threshold b, where we have Fo < 
F
m when
b 2 (0; b), and Fo > Fm when b 2 (b; 1). Then,
I. 0 < b < b; Fo < 
F
m
(1) If 2o < 
F
o then (A;P ) and (P;A) are the two NE;
(2) If Fo < 
2
o < 
F
m then (P;A) is the unique pure NE;
(3) If 2o > 
F
m, then (P; P ) is the unique pure NE.
II. b < b < 1; Fo > 
F
m
(1) If 2o < 
F
m then (A;P ) and (P;A) are the two NE;
(2) If Fm < 
2
o < 
F
o then (A;P ) is the unique pure NE;
(4) If 2o > 
F
o , then (P; P ) is the unique pure NE.
One can see the equilibrium structure is similar as in Proposition 1. Detailed explanation
is ignored here. With the results above, we prove Proposition 2 as follows.
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(1) No  Fo = a
2b4( 16+9b2)(4 4b b2+b3)2
( 2+b2)(64 64b2+15b4)2   2a
2b4( 2+b+b2)2(16 9b2)
(64 64b2+15b4)2 =
a2b5(4+3b)(4 3b)2( 2+b+b2)2
( 2+b2)(64 64b2+15b4)2 < 0,
Nm   Fo = a
2b2(4 4b b2+b3)2
8( 2+b2)2(8 3b2)   a
2b2( 1+b)2(2+b)2
4( 2+b2)( 8+3b2) =
a2b3(4 3b)( 2+b+b2)2
8(2 b2)2( 8+3b2) < 0.
(2) Nm Fo = a
2b2(4 4b b2+b3)2
8( 2+b2)2(8 3b2)   2a
2b4( 2+b+b2)2(16 9b2)
(64 64b2+15b4)2 . By solving the equation 
N
m Fo = 0,
we have a unique threshold b = 0:808675, where Nm > 
F
o when 0 < b < b
, and Nm < 
F
o
when b < b < 1. In addition, No   Fm = a
2b4( 16+9b2)(4 4b b2+b3)2
( 2+b2)(64 64b2+15b4)2   a
2b2( 1+b)2(2+b)2
4( 2+b2)( 8+3b2) =
a2b2(1 b)2(2+b)2( 512+1088b2 256b3 520b4+144b5+39b6)
4(2 b2)(8 3b2)2(8 5b2)2 < 0. Combining the above comparison, we
arrive at the following results:
i) No < 
F
o < 
N
m < 
F
m when 0 < b < b
,
ii) No < 
N
m < 
F
o < 
F
m when b
 < b < b,
iii) Nm < 
N
o < 
F
m < 
F
o when b
 < b < 1.
Proof of Table 6 and Table 7.
Table 6: Changes of Equilibria in the Case where 0 < b < b
No < 
F
o < 
N
m < 
F
m when 0 < b < b

Equilibrium without Condition of equilibrium Equilibrium with
following the CDD without following the CDD following the CDD
f(A;P ); (P;A)g 2o < No and 2m < Nm f(A;P ); (P;A)g
(A;P ) 2o < 
N
o and 
2
m > 
N
m f(A;P ); (P;A)g
(P;A)
No < 
2
o < 
F
o and 
2
m < 
N
m f(A;P ); (P;A)g
Fo < 
2
o < 
N
m and 
2
m < 
N
m (P;A)
(P; P )
No < 
2
o < 
F
o and 
2
m > 
N
m f(A;P ); (P;A)g
Fo < 
2
o < 
F
m and 
2
m > 
N
m (P;A)
2o > 
F
m (P; P )
No < 
N
m < 
F
o < 
F
m when b
 < b < b
f(A;P ); (P;A)g 2o < No and 2m < Nm f(A;P ); (P;A)g
(A;P ) 2o < 
N
o and 
2
m > 
N
m f(A;P ); (P;A)g
(P;A) No < 
2
o < 
N
m and 
2
m < 
N
m f(A;P ); (P;A)g
(P; P )
No < 
2
o < 
F
o and 
2
m > 
N
m f(A;P ); (P;A)g
Fo < 
2
o < 
F
m (P;A)
2o > 
F
m (P; P )
Table 6 states the changes of equilibria in the case where 0 < b < b, including two
subcases where 0 < b < b and b < b < b. The results in the two subcases are basically
4
Table 7: Changes of Equilibria in the Case where b < b < 1
Nm < 
N
o < 
F
m < 
F
o when b
 < b < 1
Equilibrium without Condition of equilibrium Equilibrium with
following the CDD without following the CDD following the CDD
f(A;P ); (P;A)g 2o < Nm and 2m < Nm f(A;P ); (P;A)g
(A;P )
2o < 
N
m and 
2
m > 
N
m f(A;P ); (P;A)g
Nm < 
2
o < 
N
o
No < 
2
o < 
F
m f(A;P ); (P;A)g
(P; P ) Fm < 
2
o < 
F
o (A;P )
2o > 
F
o (P; P )
the same, except for the equilibrium (P;A). Note that the manufacturer following the CDD
either makes no change or makes it move toward f(A;P ); (P;A)g when 0 < b < b,while
only the latter occurs when b < b < b. As illustrated in Figure 8, the two red lines
partition the upper-left region into four parts, corresponding to the four equilibrium outcomes
without following the CDD; the curve 2o = 
2
m is divided into three sections with dierent
colors, corresponding to the three equilibrium outcomes with following the CDD. After the
manufacturer follows the OEM's CDD, equilibria in the part with a certain color of the upper-
left region will move toward equilibria in the section with the corresponding color of the curve
2o = 
2
m. For example, equilibria in the yellow part will move toward f(A;P ); (P;A)g.
Generally, three situations can be observed, including remaining unchanged, moving
towards the equilibrium with two NE, and moving towards the equilibrium with a pure NE.
This can be explained as follows. Following the OEM's CDD endows the manufacturer with
more stable market acceptance, which increases the incentives to choose AS but reduces
the incentives to choose PS (i.e., aecting the trade-o between the commitment value and
the information value). Specically, the second situation indicates that following the CDD
increases the possibility of a sequential game. For example, when the equilibrium moves from
(A;P ) to f(A;P ); (P;A)g, following the CDD increases the possibility of another equilibrium
of sequential game (P;A). When the equilibrium moves from (P; P ) to f(A;P ); (P;A)g,
following the CDD changes a simultaneous game into a sequential game, altering the main
properties of competition between the OEM and the manufacturer. In the third situation, we
observe that one and only one case occurs where the equilibrium moves from (P; P ) to (P;A).
Following the CDD diminishes the manufacturer's operational risk of AS and information
benets from PS, thus reducing the incentives to choose PS. Therefore, the manufacturer
5
Figure 8: Comparison of Equilibria with and without following the CDD when 0 < b < b
chooses AS after acquiring stable market acceptance by following the OEM's CDD.
Similarly, Table 7 states the changes of equilibria in the case where b < b < 1. In line
with the results shown in Table 6, there also exist three situations in Table 7. The major
dierence is that in the third situation, the equilibrium moves from (P; P ) to (A;P ), rather
than (P;A). See Figure 9 for an illustration.
Proof of Lemma 5.
From Table 4, we have 'N seqi = '
F seq
i =
1
4
; 'N simi =
2(2 b2)
(4 b2)2 ; '
F sim
i =
1
(b+2)2
: One can easily
prove that 'N seqi = '
F seq
i > '
N sim
i > '
F sim
i by comparing the relative sizes of the four
coecients.
Proof of Lemma 6.
Based on Denition 1, the commitment value of the OEM (CVo) is the dierence between
the riskless prots of F APo and 
F PP
o , i.e., CVo =
2a2b4(1 b)2(16 9b2)
(64 64b2+15b4)2 . Similarly, the com-
mitment value of the manufacturer (CVm) is the dierence between the riskless prots of
F APm and 
F PP
m , i.e., CVm =
a2b2(1 b)2
4(2 b2)(8 3b2) . CVo   CVm = a
2b2(1 b)2( 512+1088b2 712b4+147b6
4(2 b2)(8 3b2)2(8 5b2)2 .
One can easily derive that there exists a unique threshold b, where we have CVo < CVm
when 0 < b < b, and CVo > CVm when b < b < 1. That is, the commitment value of the
6
Figure 9: Comparison of Equilibria with and without following the CDD when b < b < 1
manufacturer is larger (smaller) than that of the OEM if 0 < b < b(b < b < 1).
Proof of Proposition 3.
Table 6 shows that, in the case where 0 < b < b(b < b < b; resp:), if Fo < 
2
o < 
F
m
and 2m > 
N
m(
2
m > 
F
o ; resp:), the manufacturer following the CDD results in the outcome
that the equilibrium moves from (P; P ) to (P;A), i.e., the OEM remains on PS while the
manufacturer changes to AS. We then compare the prots of the OEM (manufacturer) with
and without the manufacturer following the CDD.
F PAo  N PPo = a
2(1 b)2
4(2 b2)2+
1
4
2o 

4a2(1 b)2
(8 3b2)2 +
2(2 b2)
(4 b2)2
2
o

= a
2b2(1 b2)(16 7b2)
4(2 b2)2(8 3b2)2 +
b42o
4(2 b)2(2+b)2 > 0
F PAm   N PPm = a
2(3 2b)
4(2 b2)  

a2(6 b)(2 b)
4(8 3b2) +
2(2 b2)
(4 b2)2
2
m

= a
2b2(1 b2)
4(2 b2)(8 3b2)   2(2 b
2)
(4 b2)2
2
m
In the case where 2m > 
N
m(
2
m > 
F
o ; resp:);
F PA
m   N PPm < 0:
Proof of Proposition 4.
Table 7 shows that, in the case where b < b < 1, if Fm < 
2
o < 
F
o , the manufacturer
following the CDD results in the outcome that the equilibrium moves from (P; P ) to (A;P ),
i.e., the OEM changes to AS while the manufacturer remains on PS. We then compare the
prots of the OEM (manufacturer) with and without the manufacturer following the CDD.
F APo   N PPo = 2a
2(1 b)2(2 b2)
(8 5b2)2  

4a2(1 b)2
(8 3b2)2 +
2(2 b2)
(4 b2)2
2
o

7
=  2(a
2b4( 16+9b2)(4 4b b2+b3)2+(2 b2)(64 64b2+15b4)22o)
( 2+b)2(2+b)2(8 5b2)2(8 3b2)2 .
In the case where Fm < 
2
o < 
F
o , 
F AP
o   N PPo < 0.
F APm   N PPm =

a2(12 8b b2)
4(8 5b2) +
1
4
2o

 

a2(2 b)(6 b)
4(8 3b2) +
2(2 b2)
(4 b2)2
2
m

=
(8a2b2(4 4b b2+b3)2+(64 64b2+15b4))((4 b2)22o 8(2 b2)2m)
4(4 b2)2(64 64b2+15b4) .
By solving the equation F APm  N PPm = 0, we have 2o = 8(2 b
2)
(4 b2)2
2
m  8a
2b2(4 4b b2+b3)2
(4 b2)2(64 64b2+15b4) .
Let t = 8(2 b
2)
(4 b2)2
2
m   8a
2b2(4 4b b2+b3)2
(4 b2)2(64 64b2+15b4) . The relative sizes of 
F AP
m and 
N PP
m depend on
those of 2o and t. Consider 
F
m < 
2
o < 
F
o . Then we have:
(1) if t  Fm, it satises t < 2o , and then we have F APm > N PPm . By solving the
inequality t  Fm, i.e., 8(2 b
2)
(4 b2)2
2
m  8a
2b2(4 4b b2+b3)2
(4 b2)2(64 64b2+15b4)  a
2b2( 1+b)2(2+b)2
4( 2+b2)( 8+3b2) , we have 
2
m 
a2b2(1 b)2(2 b)2(2+b)2(96+32b 44b2 20b3 5b4)
32(2 b2)2(64 64b2+15b4) = BL;
(2) if t  Fo , it satises t > 2o , and then we have F APm < N PPm . By solving the
inequality t  Fo , i.e., 8(2 b
2)
(4 b2)2
2
m   8a
2b2(4 4b b2+b3)2
(4 b2)2(64 64b2+15b4)  2a
2b4( 2+b+b2)2(16 9b2)
(64 64b2+15b4)2 , we have
2m  a
2b2(1 b)2(2 b)2(2+b)2(256 192b2+64b3+40b4 36b5 9b6)
4(2 b2)(64 64b2+15b4)2 = BH .
B. Revenue-sharing Contract
Following the same procedure as in the main body, we derive the equilibrium outcomes for
the case in which the manufacturer does not follow the CDD. The following summarizes the
results.
Scenario (A;A):
wN AA =
a(b3(2 ) b2( 22+2+4)+4b(1 )+8)
8(+1) 2b2(4 2) ;
qN AAo =
2a(1 b)
4(+1) b2(4 2) , q
N AA
m =
a(b2( 2)+2b( 2)+4(+1))
8(+1) 2b2(4 2) ;
N AAo =
4a2(1 b)2
(4(+1) b2(4 2))2 , 
N AA
m =
a2(b22 8b+4+8)
4(4(+1) b2(4 2)) .
Scenario (P; P ):
wN PP =
a(b3(2 ) b2( 22+2+4)+4b(1 )+8)
8(+1) 2b2(4 2) ;
qN PPo =
2a(1 b)
4(+1) b2(4 2) , q
N PP
m =
a(b2( 2)+2b( 2)+4(+1))
8(+1) 2b2(4 2) ;
N PPo =
4a2(1 b)2
(4(+1) b2(4 2))2 +
2(b2 2b2+2)
(b2 2b2+4)2 
2
o , 
N PP
m =
a2(b22 8b+4+8)
4(4(+1) b2(4 2)) +
2(b2 2b2+2)
(b2 2b2+4)2
2
m +
2(1 )(b2 2b2+2)
(b2 2b2+4)2 
2
o .
Scenario (A;P ):
wN AP =
a(b3( (32 8+4)) 6b2(2 )+4b(1 )+8)
b2(62 8 8)+8(+1) ;
qN APo =
2a(1 b)
b2(32 4 4)+4(+1) , q
N AP
m =
a(3b2( 2)+2b( 2)+4(+1))
b2(62 8 8)+8(+1) ;
N APo =
2a2(1 b)2(b2 2b2+2)
(3b22 4b2 4b2+4+4)2 , 
N AP
m =
a2(3b22 4b2 8b+4+8)
4(3b22 4b2 4b2+4+4) +
1
4
2m.
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Scenario (P;A):
wN PA = a( b
2 b+b+2)
2( b2++1) ;
qN PAo =
a(1 b)
2( b2++1) , q
N PA
m =
a( b++1)
2( b2++1) ;
N PAo =
a2(1 b)2
4( b2++1)2 +

4
2o , 
N PA
m =
a2( 2b++2)
4( b2++1) +
1 
4
2o .
For the case in which the manufacturer follows the CDD, the results are basically the same
as those above, except for some minor changes in the prots as: F PPo =
4a2(1 b)2
(4(+1) b2(4 2))2 +
(b 2)2
(b2 2b2+4)2
2
o , 
F PP
m =
a2(b22 8b+4+8)
4(4(+1) b2(4 2))+
b32 3b3+2b3 b22+3b2 b2+4b 8b 4+8
(b2 2b2+4)2 
2
o , and 
N AP
m =
a2(3b22 4b2 8b+4+8)
4(3b22 4b2 4b2+4+4) +
1
4
2o .
We next prove Proposition 5 for the case in which the manufacturer follows the CDD.
Similar proofs apply to the case without following the CDD, which we omit here.
For the OEM,
F AAo   F PAo = 4a
2(1 b)2
(4(+1) b2(4 2))2  

a2(1 b)2
4( b2++1)2 +

4
2o

< 0.
F APo  F PPo = 2a
2(1 b)2(b2 2b2+2)
(3b22 4b2 4b2+4+4)2 

4a2(1 b)2
(4(+1) b2(4 2))2 +
(b 2)2
(b2 2b2+4)2
2
o

. By solving
the equation F APo   F PPo = 0, we derive a threshold
Fo;r =
2a2(b 1)2(b2( 2)+4)2
(b 2)2

b2( 2)+2
(b2(32 4 4)+4(+1))2   2(b2(2 4)+4(+1))2

,
under which we have F APo > 
F PP
o if and only if 
2
o < 
F
o;r. Note that, there exists
a threshold br() 2 (0; 1) satisfying Fo;r = 0, under which we have Fo;r > 0 if and only if
br() < b < 1. Therefore, we have8><>:
F APo < 
F PP
o ; if 0 < b < br();
F APo < 
F PP
o ; if br() < b < 1 and 
2
o > 
F
o;r;
F APo > 
F PP
o ; if br() < b < 1 and 
2
o < 
F
o;r:
For the manufacturer,
F AAm   F APm = a
2(b22 8b+4+8)
4(4(+1) b2(4 2))  

a2(3b22 4b2 8b+4+8)
4(3b22 4b2 4b2+4+4) +
1
4
2o

< 0.
F PAm  F PPm = a
2( 2b++2)
4( b2++1) +
1 
4
2o 

a2(b22 8b+4+8)
4(4(+1) b2(4 2)) +
b32 3b3+2b3 b22+3b2 b2+4b 8b 4+8
(b2 2b2+4)2 
2
o

= a
2(b 1)2b22
4(1+ b2)(b22 4b2+4+4)  (b 2b+2)
2(b2 b2+4)
4(b2 2b2+4)2 
2
o . By solving the equation 
F PA
m  F PPm =
0, we derive a threshold Fm;r =
a2(b 1)2b22(b2( 2)+4)2
(b( 2)+2)2(b2( 1)+4)(1+ b2)(b2(2 4)+4(+1)) > 0, under which
we have F PAm > 
F PP
m if and only if 
2
o < 
F
m;r. That is,(
F PAm < 
F PP
m ; if 
2
o > 
F
m;r;
F PAm > 
F PP
m ; if 
2
o < 
F
m;r:
Combining the results for the OEM and the manufacturer, we derive a threshold b() 2
(br(); 1) satisfying 
F
o;r = 
F
m;r, under which we have 
F
o;r > 
F
m;r if and only if b
() < b < 1.
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Consequently, we have three regions of b: (0; br()), [br(); b
()), and [b(); 1). When
 = 1, the revenue sharing model is the same as the base model. In this case, br() = 0 and
the equilibrium is exactly the same as in Propositions 1 and 2. When  < 1, the equilibrium
structures for b 2 [br(); b()) and b 2 [b(); 1) are similar to those for b 2 (0; b) and
b 2 [b; 1) in the base model. The equilibrium structure for b 2 (0; br()) is specied in
Proposition 5. In this region, for the OEM, we have F AAo < 
F PA
o and 
F AP
o < 
F PP
o ;
that is, PS is the OEM's dominant strategy. For the manufacturer, we have F PAm > 
F PP
m
if and only if 2o < 
F
m;r. Therefore, we reach the result in Proposition 5.
C. Postponement of Wholesale Pricing
In this section, we extend our base model to a setting in which the manufacturer postpones
the wholesale price decisions until the market uncertainty is resolved if the OEM adopts the
PS strategy to take advantage of the information value. There are two possible scenarios
in this case: (P;A) and (P; P ). In (P;A), the sequence of events is: 1) the manufacturer
determines qm before demand is realized; 2) after uncertainty is resolved, the manufacturer
decides w and then the OEM determines qo. Regarding (P; P ), the sequence of events is the
same as in the base model, except that the decision of w is postponed until demand realizes.
Following the same procedure as in the main body, we derive the equilibrium outcomes for
the case in which the manufacturer does not follow the CDD. The following summarizes the
results for (P; P ) and (P;A). The results for (A;A) and (A;P ) are the same as in the base
model.
Scenario (P; P ): wN PP = (8 4b
2+b3)a
2(8 3b2) ; q
N PP
o =
2(1 b)a
8 3b2 , q
N PP
m =
(2 b)(4+b)a
2(8 3b2) ; 
N PP
o =
4(1 b)2a2
(8 3b2)2 +
2(2 b2)
(4 b2)2
2
o +
b2(20 7b2)
(4 b2)(8 3b2)2
2
m, 
N PP
m =
(2 b)(6 b)a2
4(8 3b2) +

2(2 b2)
(4 b2)2 +
b2
4(8 3b2)

2m.
Scenario (P;A): wN PA = a
2
; qN PAo =
(1 b)a
2(2 b2) , q
N PA
m =
(2 b)a
2(2 b2) ; 
N PA
o =
(1 b)2a2
4(2 b2)2 +
1
4
2o ,
N PAm =
(3 2b)a2
4(2 b2) .
The corresponding thresholds are (in contrast with those in Proposition 1): No;w =
a2(1 b)2b4(4 b2)2(16 9b2)
(2 b2)(64 64b2+15b4)2   b
2(4 b2)(20 7b2)
2(2 b2)(8 3b2)2 
2
m and 
N
m;w =
a2(2 b)2(1 b)2b2(2+b)2
(2 b2)(128 96b2+16b4+b6) .
Similarly, for the case in which the manufacturer follows the CDD, we have
Scenario (P; P ): wF PP = (8 4b
2+b3)a
2(8 3b2) ; q
F PP
o =
2(1 b)a
8 3b2 , q
F PP
m =
(2 b)(4+b)a
2(8 3b2) ; 
F PP
o =
4(1 b)2a2
(8 3b2)2 +
4(1 b)2
(8 3b2)2
2
o , 
F PP
m =
(2 b)(6 b)a2
4(8 3b2) +
(2 b)(6 b)
4(8 3b2) 
2
o .
Scenario (P;A): wF PA = a
2
; qF PAo =
(1 b)a
2(2 b2) , q
F PA
m =
(2 b)a
2(2 b2) ; 
F PA
o =
(1 b)2a2
4(2 b2)2 +
1
16
2o ,
F PAm =
(3 2b)a2
4(2 b2) +
1
8
2o .
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The corresponding thresholds are (in contrast with those in Proposition 2): Fo;w =
a2b4(16 9b2)
2(8 5b2)2 and 
F
m;w =
2a2(1 b)2b2
32 32b 6b2+16b3 5b4 .
Our main results qualitatively hold in this new setting, except that two slight dierences
arise, as we present in the extension section. We provide proofs as follows.
Proof of the rst dierence. By calculating the intersection of No;w and 
N
m;w, we have that
these two lines intersect at point (x; y) =

a2(1 b)2b4(4 b2)2(6b8+31b6 248b4+528b2 384)
2(8 5b2)2(2 b2)2(8 3b2)(b6+16b4 96b2+128) ;
a2(2 b)2(1 b)2b2(2+b)2
(2 b2)(b6+16b4 96b2+128)

,
where x(y)-axis represents 2o(
2
m). By some simple calculation, we have 0 < x < y; that
is, there exists one and only one intersection point which falls in the region above the line
2o = 
2
m. Therefore, we have similar equilibrium structure as in Proposition 1(I). The
dierence is that it holds for b 2 (0; 1) in this new setting.
Proof of the second dierence. For the OEM, F PAo   N PPo = a
2(b 1)2(16 7b2)b2
4(8 3b2)2(b2 2)2  
( b4 24b2+48)
16(b2 4)2 
2
o  (b
2(20 7b2))
(4 b2)(8 3b2)2
2
m. Following the same procedure as in the proof of Proposition
4, one can derive the following results: F APo > 
N PP
o if 
2
o  OL, and F APo < N PPo
if 2o  OH , i.e., the OEM is better o by the manufacturer's following the CDD if 2o is small
and it is worse o if 2o is large, whereOL =
4a2(b 1)2b2(4 b2)(21b6+112b5 164b4 704b3+704b2+1024b 1024)
(8 3b2)2(b2 2)2(5b2 16b+16)(b4+24b2 48) ,
and OH =
4a2b2(7b4 48b2+80)
(8 3b2)2(b4+24b2 48)

(b 1)2(b2 4)(7b2 16)
(b2 2)2(7b2 20)   2b
4(9b2 16)
(8 5b2)2

. Similarly, for the manufac-
turer, F PAm  N PPm = a
2(b 1)2b2
4(b2 2)(3b2 8)+
2o
8
 

b2
4(8 3b2) +
2(2 b2)
(4 b2)2

2m. Then we have: 
F AP
m >
N PPm if 
2
m ML, and F APm < N PPm if 2m MH , whereML =
a2b2

4(b 1)2
(b2 2)(3b2 8)+
16b2 9b4
(8 5b2)2

16

b2
32 12b2 
2(b2 2)
(b2 4)2
 ,
and MH =
2a2(6 b)(b 2)3(b 1)2b2(b+2)2
(b2 2)(5b2 16b+16)(b6+16b4 96b2+128) .
D. Correlation between "o and "m
We extend our base model by considering market acceptance uncertainty correlation: The
manufacturer faces "m = "o if he follows the CDD, and he sees "m = "o +  if not. The
random term  is independent of "o, with zero mean and variance 
2. A  with a larger 2
represents a manufacturer with less compliance with the CDD. If the manufacturer does not
follow the CDD, the mean and the variance of "m are: E["m] = E["o+] = 0, and V ar["m] =
V ar["o + ] = 
2
o + 
2. The correlation between "o and "m is:  =
Cov["o;"m]p
V ar["o]V ar["m]
= op
2o+
2
.
The expected prot functions of the OEM and the manufacturer are, respectively,
o = E[(a+ "o   qo   bqm)qo   wqo];
m = E[(a+ "o +    qm   bqo)qm + wqo]:
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If the manufacturer follows the CDD, it shares the same uncertainty with the OEM; that is,
 = 0, and  = 1. The expected prot of the manufacturer is
m = E[(a+ "o   qm   bqo)qm + wqo]:
Following the same procedure as in the main body, we derive the equilibrium outcomes
for the case in which the manufacturer does not follow the CDD, which are summarized as
follows. The results for the case in which the manufacturer follows the CDD are the same
as in the base model.
Scenario (A;A): wN AA = (8 4b
2+b3)a
2(8 3b2) ; q
N AA
o =
2(1 b)a
8 3b2 , q
N AA
m =
(2 b)(4+b)a
2(8 3b2) ; 
N AA
o =
4(1 b)2a2
(8 3b2)2 , 
N AA
m =
(2 b)(6 b)a2
4(8 3b2) .
Scenario (P; P ): wN PP = (8 4b
2+b3)a
2(8 3b2) ; q
N PP
o =
2(1 b)a
8 3b2 , q
N PP
m =
(2 b)(4+b)a
2(8 3b2) ; 
N PP
o =
4(1 b)2a2
(8 3b2)2 +
1
(2+b)2
2o , 
N PP
m =
(2 b)(6 b)a2
4(8 3b2) +
1
(2+b)2
2o +
2(2 b2)
(4 b2)2
2.
Scenario (A;P ): wN AP = (8 6b
2+b3)a
2(8 5b2) ; q
N AP
o =
2(1 b)a
8 5b2 , q
N AP
m =
(8 2b 3b2)a
2(8 5b2) ; 
N AP
o =
2(1 b)2(2 b2)a2
(8 5b2)2 , 
N AP
m =
(12 8b b2)a2
4(8 5b2) +
1
4
(2o + 
2).
Scenario (P;A): wN PA = a
2
; qN PAo =
(1 b)a
2(2 b2) , q
N PA
m =
(2 b)a
2(2 b2) ; 
N PA
o =
(1 b)2a2
4(2 b2)2 +
1
4
2o ,
N PAm =
(3 2b)a2
4(2 b2) .
We derive the thresholds in this new setting as: No;d =
2a2b4(2 b b2)2(16 9b2)
(64 64b2+15b4)2 , 
N
m;d =
a2b2(1 b)2(4 b2)2
8(2 b2)2(8 3b2) +
b(4 3b)
(4 b2)2
2
o , 
F
o;d =
2a2b4(2 b b2)2(16 9b2)
(64 64b2+15b4)2 , 
F
m;d =
a2b2(1 b)2(2+b)2
4(2 b2)(8 3b2) , and b

d = 0:9565,
which correspond to, respectively, No , 
N
m , 
F
o , 
F
m, and b
 in the base model. Our main
results qualitatively hold, except that the manufacturer's following the CDD does not benet
itself anymore (recall that in Proposition 4 where b < b < 1, the manufacturer benets from
following the CDD if 2m is relatively small). We provide the proof of this dierence as follows.
Proof. When b < b < 1, we have Nm;d < 
F
m;d < 
N
o;d = 
F
o;d. Consider the region where
Fm;d < 
2
o < 
F
o;d (which is similar to that in Proposition 4), the equilibrium is (A;P ) despite
whether the manufacturer follows the CDD or not. Therefore, we only need to compare
the manufacturer's prots in (A;P ) in these two cases. The manufacturer is worse o by
following the OEM's CDD, as demonstrated as follows.
F APm   N APm =

(12 8b b2)a2
4(8 5b2) +
1
4
2o

 

(12 8b b2)a2
4(8 5b2) +
1
4
(2o + 
2)

=  1
4
2 < 0
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E. Non-zero Production Cost
If the manufacturer incurs a marginal production cost c with c < a, rms' expected prots
are, respectively,
o = E[(a+ "o   qo   bqm)qo   wqo];
m = E[(a+ "m   qm   bqo   c)qm + (w   c)qo]:
We summarize as follows the equilibrium outcomes for the case in which the manufacturer
does not follow the CDD.
Scenario (A;A): wN AA = (8 4b
2+b3)a+(8 2b2 b3)c
2(8 3b2) ; q
N AA
o =
2(1 b)(a c)
8 3b2 , q
N AA
m =
(2 b)(4+b)(a c)
2(8 3b2) ;
N AAo =
4(1 b)2(a c)2
(8 3b2)2 , 
N AA
m =
(2 b)(6 b)(a c)2
4(8 3b2) .
Scenario (P; P ): wN PP = (8 4b
2+b3)a+(8 2b2 b3)c
2(8 3b2) ; q
N PP
o =
2(1 b)(a c)
8 3b2 , q
N PP
m =
(2 b)(4+b)(a c)
2(8 3b2) ;
N PPo =
4(1 b)2(a c)2
(8 3b2)2 +
2(2 b2)
(4 b2)2
2
o , 
N PP
m =
(2 b)(6 b)(a c)2
4(8 3b2) +
2(2 b2)
(4 b2)2
2
m.
Scenario (A;P ): wN AP = (8 6b
2+b3)a+(8 4b2 b3)c
2(8 5b2) ; q
N AP
o =
2(1 b)(a c)
8 5b2 , q
N AP
m =
(8 2b 3b2)(a c)
2(8 5b2) ;
N APo =
2(1 b)2(2 b2)(a c)2
(8 5b2)2 , 
N AP
m =
(12 8b b2)(a c)2
4(8 5b2) +
1
4
2m.
Scenario (P;A): wN PA = a+c
2
; qN PAo =
(1 b)(a c)
2(2 b2) , q
N PA
m =
(2 b)(a c)
2(2 b2) ; 
N PA
o =
(1 b)2(a c)2
4(2 b2)2 +
1
4
2o , 
N PA
m =
(3 2b)(a c)2
4(2 b2) .
The results for the case in which the manufacturer follows the CDD are basically the
same as the results above, except for some minor changes in rms' prots as: F PPo =
4(1 b)2(a c)2
(8 3b2)2 +
1
(b+2)2
2o , 
F PP
m =
(2 b)(6 b)(a c)2
4(8 3b2) +
1
(b+2)2
2o , 
F AP
m =
(12 8b b2)(a c)2
4(8 5b2) +
1
4
2o .
The thresholds in this extended model are No;c =
(a c)2b4(1 b)2(4 b2)2(16 9b2)
(2 b2)(15b4 64b2+642) , 
N
m;c =
(a c)2b2(1 b)2(4 b2)2
8(2 b2)2(8 3b2) , 
F
o;c =
2(a c)2b4(2 b b2)2(16 9b2)
(64 64b2+15b4)2 , 
F
m;c =
(a c)2b2(1 b)2(2+b)2
4(2 b2)(8 3b2) , and b

c = 0:9565,
which correspond to, respectively, No , 
N
m , 
F
o , 
F
m, and b
 in the base model.
One can see that compared with the results in the base model, by simply replacing a
with a  c, we can get the new equilibrium outcomes and threshold values (except w, which
is a weighted average of a and c). Therefore, our main results still qualitatively hold when
non-zero production cost is incorporated.
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